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CRIMINAL LAW
CONFRONTING COGNITIVE “ANCHORING
EFFECT” AND “BLIND SPOT” BIASES IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING:
A MODEST SOLUTION FOR REFORMING A
FUNDAMENTAL FLAW
MARK W. BENNETT*
Cognitive “anchoring effect” bias, especially related to numbers, like
sentencing guidelines ranges, is widely recognized in cognitive psychology
as an extremely robust and powerful heuristic. It is a cognitive shortcut that
has a strong tendency to undermine judgments by “anchoring” a judgment
to an earlier disclosed number, the anchor. Numerous studies prove
anchoring bias produces systematic errors in judgment in wide-ranging
circumstances, including judgments by experts—doctors, lawyers, real estate
agents, psychologists, and auditors—as well as a variety of decisions by
foreign and American federal and state judges. The anchoring effect occurs
even when the anchor is incomplete, inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, or
even random. Roughly corresponding in time with the developing
understanding of the anchoring effect, federal sentencing has undergone a
revolution from judges having virtually unlimited discretion, to virtually no
discretion, and back to considerable discretion, as the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines went from mandatory to advisory in a single monumental U.S.
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Surprisingly, since judges were granted much greater discretion in Booker,
the length and severity of federal sentences, for the most part, has not
changed.
This remains true despite long-standing, persistent, and
* Mark W. Bennett is in his twentieth year as a federal district court judge in the Northern
District of Iowa, having sentenced more than 4,000 defendants, spanning four districts and
two circuits, and is an even longer term adjunct professor at the Drake University School of
Law. The author is extremely grateful to Sarah French Russell for her insightful review of,
and immensely helpful suggestions for, the earlier draft of this Article.

489

490

MARK W. BENNETT

[Vol. 104

widespread dissatisfaction among federal district court judges with the
Guidelines and the length of sentences. This Article argues that this is
because judges’ sentences are subconsciously anchored by the calculated
Guidelines range. This Article offers a simple, modest, and practical solution
that requires no change in existing law by the Supreme Court or Congress.
It simply requires rearranging the numerical anchoring information in the
presentence report and adding additional relevant numerical information to
counteract the anchoring effect of the Guidelines. If federal district court
judges are educated about the effect of cognitive anchoring and their own
bias-based blind spots to it—their improved awareness can only enhance the
fairness of sentencing.
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INTRODUCTION
“God not only plays dice. He also sometimes throws the dice where
they cannot be seen.”
—Stephen William Hawking1
Trial judges, too, roll dice in sentencing. They just do it unwittingly.
Like God’s dice roll in Hawking’s quote above, judges’ dice rolls are never
seen—except in one startling series of studies establishing that the actual
number rolled on the dice, when disclosed to the judges, affected the length
of sentences they gave! For state and federal judges who sentence pursuant
to advisory guidelines, there are potent psychological heuristics at play.
“Psychologists have learned that human beings rely on mental shortcuts . . .
‘heuristics,’ to make complex decisions. Reliance on these heuristics . . . can
also produce systematic errors in judgment. . . . [C]ertain fact patterns can
fool people’s judgment, leading them to believe things that are not really
true.”2 These heuristics have a strong potential to affect the length of
sentences. Whether judges consider their sentencing philosophy to be tough,
lenient, or in between, to be the best judges they can be, they need to
recognize and understand how these cognitive and implicit forces tend to
increase judges’ sentences without their conscious knowledge.
This Article explores how judges’ hidden cognitive biases, specifically
the “anchoring effect” and, to a lesser extent, the “bias blind spot,” impact
the length of sentences they impose by subconsciously influencing judges to
give greater weight to the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines than
to other important sentencing factors. Biologically, every mammalian eye
has a scotoma in its field of vision—colloquially known as a blind spot.3
Everyone, including sentencing judges, has blind spots. This Article is not
concerned with our scotomas, the physical blind spots of our eyes, but with
their psychological corollary: the cognitive bias known as the “bias blind
spot.” This psychological blind spot prevents us from seeing our own
cognitive biases, yet allows us to see them in others.4 This “tendency to see
1

CHAMBERS DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 460–61 (Alison Jones ed., 1996).
Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780 (2001)
(citations omitted).
3
As the authors of the new book, Blindspot: Hidden Biases of Good People, note in their
preface, all vertebrates have a blind spot in each of the retinas of their eyes. MAHZARIN R.
BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE, at xi
(2013). “This region, a scotoma (from the Greek word for darkness), has no light-sensitive
cells and therefore light arriving at that spot has no path to the visual areas of your brain.
Paradoxically, you can ‘see’ your own blind spot.” Id.
4
Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681–82 (2005).
2
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bias in others, while being blind to it in ourselves,” means that judges
impacted by the anchoring effect in sentencing are unlikely to recognize it.5
This creates a double bind for judges. First, a lack of awareness prevents
perception of the powerful and robust impact of the anchoring effect in
sentencing. Second, once one becomes aware of the anchoring effect, an
inability to see how the anchoring effect impacts one’s own sentencing
persists because of the “bias blind spot.” “Moreover, to the extent that judges
might consider themselves experts in the law, they are probably more
confident of their abilities to disregard biases than they should be.”6
Even more troubling, research indicates that sentencing judges are
influenced by anchors, even irrelevant anchors, to the same extent as lay
people and that the effects of the anchors are not reduced by the judges’ actual
experience.7 Compounding this conundrum is that while more experienced
judges are equally susceptible to the effects of anchoring as novices, they
“feel more certain about their judgments.”8 That is why it is critically
important for sentencing judges, probation officers who prepare presentence
reports, and practicing lawyers to understand the potential robust and
powerful anchoring effect of advisory Guidelines and the effect of the “bias
blind spot” in determining just sentences.
In the last quarter century, federal sentencing has undergone enormous
upheaval: from unbridled discretion to sentence as low as probation up to the
statutory maximum, to the mandatory and inflexible United States
Sentencing Guidelines—the grin-and-bear-it approach to sentencing9—to
advisory Guidelines with the return of significant, but not unbridled
discretion. Shockingly, given the substantial judicial displeasure and even
hostility toward the Guidelines, the return of substantial discretion has not
significantly altered the length of most defendants’ sentences. I suggest that
this is due primarily to the anchoring effect. Computing the advisory

5
Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
565, 565 (2007). Pronin and Kugler provide a fascinating explanation as to why people
possess a “bias blind spot,” a subject beyond the reach of this Article.
6
Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes, 41
U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 303 (2007).
7
Birte Englich et al., Playing Dice with Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant
Anchors on Experts’ Judicial Decision Making, 32 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 188,
197 (2006). “Experienced criminal judges who have worked on many related cases and have
made many related sentencing decisions were still influenced by a sentencing demand that was
determined by throwing a set of dice.” Id.
8
Id. at 198.
9
The sentencing table, or grid, of the United States Sentencing Guidelines contains 258
cells, each containing a sentencing range. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A,
sentencing tbl. (2012).
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Guideline range so early in the sentencing process strongly anchors a judge’s
sentence to that range, or close to it. This is true even when compelling
factors suggest a significantly lower or, on rare occasions, higher sentence.10
This Article is organized as follows. Part I comprehensively examines
the anchoring effect in a variety of intriguing settings through the lens of
classic cognitive anchoring studies. Part II focuses on cognitive anchoring
studies in several judicial contexts that involve actual judges, including some
from Germany, but mostly federal and state court judges in the United States.
Together, these first Parts provide a more thorough and in-depth analysis of
the robustness of the anchoring effect than any prior scholarship discussing
judges and anchoring.
Part III presents an overview of the federal sentencing revolution, from
the implementation of the mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines in
1987 through the Booker11 and Gall12 shockwaves arising from the
Apprendi13 upheaval leading to the now-advisory Guidelines. These advisory
Guidelines restore substantial, but not unlimited, sentencing discretion. Part
IV examines the statistical trends of federal sentencing, showing that the
Guidelines, even in their current advisory role, continue to exert a strong
gravitational pull on federal sentencing. This Part also explains that the result
of this pull is that very little has changed in terms of the length of federal
judges’ sentences, even with their new, broad discretion. Part V argues that
the most likely culprit as to why federal district court judges have remained
so tethered to the Guidelines, post Booker and Gall, despite their wide
dissatisfaction with them, is the anchoring effect.
Part VI offers a modest, sententious but meaningful and straightforward
proposal to help reduce the undesirable anchoring effect of the Guidelines.
The proposal reorders the information in the presentence report (PSR)
prepared by the U.S. Probation Office in every federal sentencing. Rather
than disclosing the often complex Sentencing Guidelines calculations early
in the PSR (where the anchoring effect comes in), the information about the
defendant’s personal history and other factors that a judge must consider and
may use to vary downward or upward from the Guidelines would be
disclosed first. The judge could then note on the PSR a preliminary
10
Upward variances occur with great infrequency. For example, in fiscal year 2011, of
the 76,216 defendants sentenced that the USSC received sufficient information to analyze,
only 1.9% received an above-Guidelines-range sentence, while 18.6% received a nongovernment sponsored, below-range sentence. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE
CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING pt. C, at 13–17
(2012), available at http://goo.gl/f6HmIH.
11
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
12
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).
13
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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sentencing range based on everything the judge is required to consider
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and reach a tentative sentencing range before
the PSR discloses the advisory Guidelines sentencing range. This reordering
would greatly help in reducing the anchoring effect of the Guidelines. The
judge would first have to confront why the initial sentencing range he or she
wrote down, unencumbered by the actual computed Guidelines range, was
different. The judge would then decide if the gravitational pull of the
Guidelines unfairly influenced his or her § 3553(a) analysis or vice versa.
Also, other highly relevant numerical sentencing information not currently
included in the PSR should be presented in the latter portions of the PSR to
counteract the anchoring effect of the Guidelines. Unlike prior unrealistic
proposals offered by law professors to reduce the effect of anchoring in
federal sentencing,14 this proposal requires no further action by the U.S.
Supreme Court or Congress and is easily implemented by any federal district
court judge that chooses to adopt this recommendation.
I. THE POWER AND ROBUSTNESS OF THE “ANCHORING EFFECT”
A. BACKGROUND

Virtually all judges strive to be as fair and rational as possible when
sentencing. But what if there are hidden psychological processes quietly at
work that undermine their best efforts to be fair? Psychologists label such
processes “cognitive biases.”15 These biases—which can lead to serious
mistakes in decisionmaking, judgment, and reasoning—can cause judges to
hold on to certain preferences and beliefs regardless of contrary, persuasive
information.16
14

See Jelani Jefferson Exum, The More Things Change: A Psychological Case Against
Allowing the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Stay the Same In Light of Gall, Kimbrough,
and New Understandings of Reasonableness Review, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 115, 150 (2008)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court could “take the steps to do away with the Guidelines
calculation requirement”); Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS
L.J. 423, 463 (2013) (arguing that the courts should consider the Guidelines “midstream” in
sentencing procedures but recognizing this is contrary to Supreme Court sentencing
requirements).
15
Cory S. Clements, Comment, Perception and Persuasion in Legal Argumentation:
Using Informal Fallacies and Cognitive Biases to Win the War of Words, 2013 BYU L. REV.
319, 334 (“Phenomena studied in social psychology and cognitive science, cognitive biases
are common mistakes and predispositions in mental processing that affect people’s beliefs and
understandings of the world.”).
16
The precise number of identified cognitive biases is uncertain, but one online source
lists ninety-three types of cognitive biases, from “[a]mbiguity effect” to “[z]ero-sum
heuristic.” List of Cognitive Biases, WIKIPEDIA, http://goo.gl/5ECRMB (last updated Feb. 12,
2014, 11:18 AM). Often, more than one cognitive bias is at play. See, e.g., Michael A.
McCann, It’s Not About the Money: The Role of Preferences, Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics
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Anchoring is a cognitive bias that describes the human tendency to
adjust judgments or assessments higher or lower based on previously
disclosed external information—the “anchor.”17 Studies demonstrate “that
decisionmakers tend to focus their attention on the anchor value and to adjust
insufficiently to account for new information.”18 Cognitive psychology
teaches that the anchoring effect potentially impacts a huge range of
judgments people make. This includes people who have developed expertise
in their fields, like experienced real estate agents,19 auto mechanics,20 and
physicians.21 In discussing cognitive biases among specialized experts,
Jeffrey Rachlinski and his colleagues observe: “Research on some experts—
including doctors, real estate agents, psychologists, auditors, lawyers, and
judges—shows that they often make the same kinds of mistakes the rest of
us make.”22 Amazingly, repeated studies show that the “anchor” produces
an effect on judgment or assessment even when the anchor is incomplete,
inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, or random. When it comes to numbers,
“[o]verwhelming psychological research demonstrates that people estimate
or evaluate numbers by ‘anchoring’ on a preliminary number and then
adjusting, usually inadequately, from the initial anchor.”23 Without a
thorough and comprehensive understanding of anchoring studies, it is nearly
impossible to grasp the full impact of the anchoring effect on sentencing
under an advisory Guidelines regime.
B. THE COGNITIVE “ANCHORING EFFECT” STUDIES

In the 1970s, the notion of cognitive biases was first noted by cognitive
psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman and reported in their

Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459 (2006) (considering the following
cognitive biases: framing effects, confirmation bias, optimism bias, hindsight bias, the
anchoring effect, and endowment effects at work when professional athletes consider contract
offers); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227
(2006) (considering anchoring, framing, and omission bias in bankruptcy judges’ decisions).
17
Todd McElroy & Keith Dowd, Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects: How Openness-toExperience Influences Responses to Anchoring Cues, 2 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 48,
48 (2007).
18
Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in Legal Decision Making,
88 CORNELL L. REV. 583, 602–03 (2003).
19
Birte Englich & Thomas Mussweiler, Sentencing Under Uncertainty: Anchoring Effects
in the Courtroom, 31 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1535, 1536–37 (2001).
20
Id.
21
Noel T. Brewer et al., The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on the Judgments and
Choices of Doctors and Patients, MED. DECISION MAKING, Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 203, 208.
22
Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1229–30 (footnotes omitted).
23
Alafair S. Burke, Prosecutorial Passion, Cognitive Bias, and Plea Bargaining, 91
MARQ. L. REV. 183, 201 (2007).
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classic work, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.24 In one
of their studies described in that work, which “is often seen as the classic
anchoring study,”25 Tversky and Kahneman asked the study participants
questions about the percentage of African nations in the United Nations.26
The participants were asked if the percentage of African nations was higher
or lower than an arbitrary number (the anchor), which they selected by
spinning a wheel of fortune before them.27 After the wheel landed, for
example, on the number 10, the participants were asked if the percentage of
African nations was higher or lower than 10.28 They were then asked what
their best judgment was as to the percentage of African nations in the United
Nations.29 Participants given the number 10 anchor gave median averages of
25%, while those given the number 65 anchor gave median averages of
45%.30 The anchoring effect occurred even though the anchors selected and
known to the participants were random and bore no rational relationship to
the judgment.
In February 2013, I conducted a similar anchoring test while conducting
a training session in Dallas on implicit bias for lawyers in the Leadership
Academy of the Torts, Trial, and Insurance Practice Section of the American
Bar Association. Half the lawyers were asked in writing if Texas, at its
widest point, was narrower or wider than 820 miles. The other half were
asked the same question, but the “anchor” changed to 420 miles. Each lawyer
only saw one anchor, either 820 or 420 miles, on the written sheet before him
or her and had no idea what, if any, number/“anchor” the others received.
The lawyers, none of whom were from Texas, were then asked to write down
how wide they thought Texas was at its widest point. The lawyers given the

24

See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). Kahneman went on to win the Nobel Prize
in 2002 for his work in behavioral economics. See Alex Stein, Book Review, Are People
Probabilistically Challenged?, 111 MICH. L. REV. 855, 855 (2013) (reviewing DANIEL
KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011)); The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic
Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2002, NOBELPRIZE.ORG, http://goo.gl/6kix5Q (last visited
May 22, 2014).
25
Thomas Mussweiler, The Malleability of Anchoring Effects, 49 EXPERIMENTAL
PSYCHOL. 67, 68 (2002).
26
Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 24, at 1128.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
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420 mile anchor judged the width of Texas to be 59% shorter than the lawyers
given the 820 mile anchor.31 The actual width of Texas is 773 miles.32
In yet another series of anchoring studies, participants were asked “how
thick a piece of paper would be if it were folded in on itself 100 times.”33
The results? “Only rarely do people give estimates larger than a few yards
or meters, yet the correct answer, given an initial sheet of paper 0.1 millimeter
thick, is roughly 1.27 x 1023 kilometers—more than 800,000,000,000,000
times the distance between the earth and the sun!”34 Few get anywhere near
this answer “because they begin by imagining the first few folds (a very low
anchor) and do not adjust their estimate upward sufficiently for the doubling
effect of later folds.”35
The next anchoring study is important because it demonstrates the
power of anchoring in a real world setting and also establishes that
professionals with specialized expertise are not immune to the power of
anchoring.36 In a classic study of real estate prices, dozens of real estate
agents in the Tucson, Arizona area, after touring two houses and receiving
the standard ten-page packet of information, were asked to give their best
estimates of: (1) the appraised value, (2) the appropriate selling price, (3) “a
reasonable price to pay for the house,” and (4) the lowest offer they would
accept if they were the seller.37 All the agents received the same information,
except the listing price: some received a listing price 11% to 12% above the
appraised value, some 11% to 12% below the appraised value, some 4%
below, and some 4% above.38 As can be seen in Figure 1, “the agents
consistently saw the listing price as too high (regardless of what the listing
price was) and all four estimates showed significant evidence of anchoring.
Interestingly, however, when asked what their top three considerations were

31

In February 2013, I replicated this anchoring study with eleven Drake University School
of Law students in my Employment Discrimination Litigation class. The results were nearly
identical to those in Dallas. This was true even with the much smaller sample size. The data
for both studies is on file with the author.
32
See, e.g., Tex. State Historical Ass’n, Environment, TEX. ALMANAC,
http://goo.gl/DzZ8CP (last visited May 22, 2014) (“The greatest east-west distance is 773
miles from the extreme eastward bend in the Sabine River in Newton County to the extreme
western bulge of the Rio Grande just above El Paso.”).
33
SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 149 (1993).
34
Id. (“The correct answer can be found by multiplying the thickness of the paper (0.1
millimeter) by the total number of layers (2100). This number works out to be 1.27 x 1029
millimeters, or 1.27 x 1023 kilometers.”).
35
Id.
36
Id. at 148–49.
37
Id. at 148.
38
Id.
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in making these judgments, only 1 agent in 10 mentioned the listing price.”39
This is because anchoring works at the subconscious level.
Figure 1
The Effects of Anchoring on Real Estate Prices40
Apparent
Listing
Price
$119,900
$129,900
$139,900
$149,900

MEAN ESTIMATES GIVEN BY REAL ESTATE AGENTS
Appraised Recommended
Reasonable
Lowest
Value
Selling Price
Purchase Price
Offer
$114,204
$117,745
$111,454
$111,136
$126,772
$127,836
$123,209
$122,254
$125,041
$128,530
$124,653
$121,884
$128,754
$130,981
$127,318
$123,818

What about the effect of arbitrary anchors in unrelated tasks? In an
anchoring experiment conducted by Timothy Wilson and his colleagues,
participants were asked to copy either five pages of numbers ranging from
4,421 to 4,579; four pages of random words and one page of four-digit
numbers; or five pages of random words.41 They were then asked to estimate
the number of current students at the University of Virginia who will contract
cancer in the next forty years.42 The participants who copied the five pages
of numbers estimated the number of incidences of cancer to be substantially
higher than the group that copied one page of numbers, and that group was
higher (although not significantly so) than the group who copied no
numbers.43 Figure 2 summarizes the results of this study. Thus, the
anchoring effect occurs even when the arbitrary anchor is presented in an
unrelated preceding task.44 Interestingly, the participants gave low estimates
when asked how much the anchor influenced their answers, but gave higher
estimates for others being influenced.45 In fact, 86% reported the anchor had
“no effect” on their answers.46 The authors concluded that “[t]hese results

39

Id.
Id. at 149 tbl.13.1 (citation omitted).
41
Thomas Mussweiler et al., Anchoring Effect, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A HANDBOOK ON
FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGEMENT AND MEMORY 183, 188 (Rüdiger F. Pohl ed.,
2004) (citing Timothy D. Wilson et al., A New Look at Anchoring Effects: Basic Anchoring
and Its Antecedents, 125 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 387 (1996)).
42
Id.
43
Wilson et al., supra note 41, at 394.
44
Id. at 394–95; see also Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 183–200.
45
Wilson et al., supra note 41, at 395.
46
Id. at 394.
40
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are consistent with the assumption that anchoring effects are unintentional
and nonconscious . . . .”47
Figure 2
Ratings of the Number of Students Who Will Get Cancer in the Next
Forty Years as a Function of the Anchoring Condition48
3,500
3,000

3,186

2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000

1,645
1,645

1,765

500
0
No Numbers

1 Page of Numbers

5 Pages of Numbers

The anchoring effect impacts judgments, even when the anchor is
extreme. In a study conducted by Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack,
participants were asked if Mahatma Gandhi was “older or younger than either
140 years or 9 years” at the time of his death.49 Participants, who received
the high anchor, 140 years, estimated on average that Gandhi lived to the age
of 67 years.50 Participants, who received the lower anchor, 9 years, estimated
on average that Gandhi lived to the age of 50.51 The authors concluded,
“[T]he consideration of what is clearly an impossible state of affairs (i.e.,
Gandhi having reached the age of 9 or 140 years) strongly influenced
subsequent judgments.”52
Thus, stunningly, the anchoring effect occurs even when the anchor is
ludicrous or implausible. In another study, college students provided a higher

47

Id. at 395.
Id. at 395 fig.4 (modified form).
49
Thomas Mussweiler & Fritz Strack, Considering the Impossible: Explaining the Effects
of Implausible Anchors, 19 SOC. COGNITION 145, 146 (2001).
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
48
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estimate of the average cost of a college textbook when they were first asked
if it was higher or lower than $7,128.53.53 In a different study, people
provided higher estimates of the average annual temperature in San Francisco
when first asked if it was higher or lower than 558 degrees.54
Importantly, the anchoring effect is greater when the anchor is plausible
rather than implausible.55 In another study conducted by Mussweiler and
Strack, the participants were asked about the average annual mean
temperature in the Antarctic: “Is the annual mean temperature in the
Antarctic higher or lower than X°C?” and, “How high is the annual mean
temperature in the Antarctic?”56 Two implausible anchors were used: 700°C
and 900°C.57 Two plausible anchors were also used: -17°C and -3°C.58 The
actual mean temperature in the Antarctic was -68°C.59 The plausible anchors
were established from another set of similarly situated participants who were
simply asked, “How high is the annual mean temperature in the Antarctic?”60
The plausible temperatures used in the actual study were based on one
standard deviation above the mean for the high anchor (-17°C) and one
standard deviation below the mean for the low anchor (-43°C) from the
pretest group.61 The implausible low anchor (700°C) “was about 56 standard
deviations above the mean” of the pretest group and the “high implausible
anchor (900°C) was about 72 standard deviations above” the pretest group.62
“Thus, the difference between the two implausible anchors was about 8 times
that between the two plausible anchors. For each participant the critical
comparative anchoring question contained one of these four anchors.”63 The
results of the study are summarized in Figure 3. Analysis of Figure 3 reveals
that while there was a much greater difference between the two implausible
anchors (700°C v. 900°C) than the two plausible anchors (-17°C v. -43°C),
“the difference in the resulting absolute estimates was much larger for the
plausible than the implausible anchors.”64
53

Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 788 & n.53 (citing PLOUS, supra note 33, at 146).
Id. at 788–89 (citing PLOUS, supra note 33, at 146).
55
See generally Mussweiler & Strack, supra note 49.
56
Id. at 153.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 154. To verify this conclusion, Mussweiler and Strack replicated the study in
principle in a second study, a knock-off of their earlier Mahatma Gandhi study, using two
plausible anchors (61 and 86 years) and two implausible anchors (214 and 271 years). The
Gandhi study results supported the Antarctic study conclusion. Id. at 155–56.
54
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Figure 3
Absolute Estimates for the Annual Mean Temperature in the Antarctic by
Anchor and Plausibility65
Anchor
High
Low

PLAUSIBILITY
Plausible
Implausible
-24.84 (SD = 16.36) -24.44 (SD = 18.58)
-41.12 (SD = 16.79) -23.27 (SD = 13.83)

Many studies have observed that anchoring also influences the
outcomes of mock civil jury verdicts.66 In one study, researchers found that
the amount of money requested by the plaintiff’s lawyer for damages in a
personal injury case directly anchored the amount of damages awarded by
the mock jurors.67 The mock jurors received the exact same set of facts about
the plaintiff’s injury, except the amount requested by the plaintiff’s lawyer
was different, and the mock jurors were told the request was either $100,000;
$300,000; $500,000; or $700,000.68 As Figure 4 indicates, the more the
plaintiff’s lawyer requested, the more the mock jurors awarded in damages
to the plaintiff.
Figure 4
Effects of Requesting Different Damage
Amounts in Personal Injury Trials69

65

Damages Request

Mean Award

$100,000
$300,000
$500,000
$700,000

$90,333
$188,462
$282,868
$421,538

Id. at 154.
Dan Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New
Insights from Meta-analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 605 n.43 (2006) (citing
numerous studies).
67
Id. at 606; see also John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects
of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491,
495 (1989).
68
Malouff & Schutte, supra note 67, at 495.
69
Id.
66
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Dan Orr and Chris Guthrie conducted the first meta-analysis70 of the
effect of anchoring with an opening number or demand in negotiations to
measure the impact of these first numbers on outcomes and to “assess how
potent this phenomenon is.”71 The authors concluded that the “meta-analysis
demonstrates that anchoring has a powerful impact on negotiation.”72
However, Orr and Guthrie also concluded that anchoring “has a less
pronounced—though still quite substantial—impact in circumstances where
the recipient of the anchor is an experienced negotiator and where the
recipient possesses a rich body of information containing competing anchor
points.”73 The authors also noted that “[a]nchoring can be pernicious in
court,” leading to “serving an inappropriately long sentence in jail.”74
In summary, the anchoring effect heuristic has been repeatedly
confirmed in a multitude of cognitive bias studies since Tversky and
Kahneman first wrote about it in 1974. Virtually all cognitive psychologists
agree that previous research on anchoring has shown this heuristic to be a
robust psychological phenomenon ubiquitous across many domains of
human judgment and decisionmaking.75 Assessments and judgments are
affected by “anchors,” even when the anchors are incomplete, inaccurate,
irrelevant, implausible, or random.76 Of critical significance for this Article

70

“Meta-analysis” is defined as “a quantitative statistical analysis of several separate but
similar experiments or studies in order to test the pooled data for statistical significance.”
Meta-analysis – Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://goo.gl/vRyibT (last
visited May 22, 2014).
71
Orr & Guthrie, supra note 66, at 598.
72
Id. at 624.
73
Id. at 628.
74
Id. at 608.
75
See Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 196.
76
In general, four theoretical accounts or mechanisms of anchoring have been proposed:
(1) insufficient adjustment from a starting point, (2) conversational inferences, (3) numeric
priming, and (4) selective accessibility. Id. at 189. Surprisingly, there is little consensus
among cognitive experts as to the precise theoretical models for how the anchoring effect
actually works in a given situation. See, e.g., Mussweiler et al., supra note 41, at 196 (“The
various paradigms that have been used to examine anchoring effects, however, appear to differ
with respect to the additional mechanisms they may involve. With a perspective on
psychological processes rather than judgemental effects, we may well find that what has
previously been considered as instantiations of one judgemental heuristic called ‘anchoring’
is actually a conglomeration of fairly diverse phenomena whose similarity rests solely on the
net outcome they produce.”); Brewer et al., supra note 21, at 210–11 (“The anchoring bias has
presented longstanding fascination for those in the field of judgment and decision making.
The present findings suggest that irrelevant anchors may have more complex effects than
initially thought, particularly when the bias extends from judgment to choice. Models of the
anchoring bias may require refinement to better reflect such findings.”); Mussweiler & Strack,
supra note 49, at 146 (“Although such effects of implausible anchors are well documented in
the literature . . . little is known about the psychological mechanisms that produce them.”);
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are the findings that the more plausible the anchor, the greater the effect it
has on distorting assessment and judgment. Scott Plous, after discussing
many of the anchoring studies mentioned above, concludes “[t]he effects of
anchoring are pervasive and extremely robust. More than a dozen studies
point in the same direction: People adjust insufficiently from anchor values,
regardless of whether the judgment concerns the chances of nuclear war, the
value of a house, or any number of other topics.”77 Or, in the case of
sentencing, judges adjust insufficiently from the anchoring effect of the
advisory Guidelines range where the judgment concerns length of sentence.
II. JUDGES AND THE ANCHORING EFFECT
Are judges somehow immune to the anchoring effect? One might think
that by virtue of our education, training, and experience in assessing and
judging evidence and facts we might be. A plethora of empirical studies
establish that cognitive biases, sometimes including anchoring, infect the
judgments of professionals, including doctors, lawyers, accountants, real
estate appraisers, option traders, psychologists, military leaders, and
engineers.78 In three recent studies, one of federal magistrate judges
(generalist judges),79 one of federal bankruptcy judges (specialist judges),80
and the third involving both state and federal judges,81 the authors found each
group of judges susceptible to strong anchoring effects. Before turning to
these studies in some detail, a brief look at a series of studies about judges in
Germany confirming the existence of the anchoring effect in sentencing is in
order.
A. THE GERMAN JUDGES STUDIES

A series of studies using German judges sheds light on the effect of
anchoring in determining the length of sentences.82 In one such study,
researchers found that anchoring influenced the length of a sentence in a rape
case.83 The researchers presented German criminal trial court judges with a

Mussweiler, supra note 25, at 71 (“These findings appear to be inconsistent with a numeric
priming account of anchoring . . . .”).
77
PLOUS, supra note 33, at 151.
78
Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 782–83 (footnotes omitted).
79
Id. at 786–92.
80
Rachlinski et al., supra note 16.
81
Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty
of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
82
Englich et al., supra note 7, at 190–93; Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1538–
41.
83
Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1538–41.
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lengthy vignette of a rape case.84 The participating judges were assigned one
of two conditions: in the first group, the judges learned that the prosecutor
had requested a two-month sentence for the defendant, and the second group
was told that the prosecutor had requested a sentence of thirty-four months.85
The judges exposed to the higher anchor (thirty-four months) increased their
average sentences by more than 50%.86
Another German judge study using real judges in a mock sentencing
scenario found that the judges were influenced by the anchor number given
by a news reporter in an unexpected telephone call where the reporter asked:
“Do you think that the sentence for the defendant in this case will be higher
or lower than [1 or 3] year(s)?”87 Half the judges were exposed to the low
anchor (one year) and half to the high anchor (three years).88 The judges
were requested not to answer the reporter’s question.89 The participants
given the low anchor imposed an average sentence of 25.43 months, and
those exposed to the high anchor gave an average sentence of 33.38 months.90
The participants in the study were both prosecutors and judges, and there was
no difference in the data.91
The lead author of these and other studies of German judges’ criminal
sentencing practices, Birte Englich, observes: “In general, judicial sentencing
decisions should be guided by facts and not by chance. Disconcertingly,
however, several studies have shown that sentencing decisions—even those
made by experienced legal professionals—are influenced by demands that
are blatantly determined at random.”92 Englich notes that: “Converging
evidence suggests that judicial decisions may indeed be influenced by
anchors.”93 Englich further observes that several studies demonstrate, in the
criminal context, that real judges’ sentences were strongly influenced by the
prosecutors’ sentencing suggestions, even when the suggestions were
84

Id.
Id. at 1540.
86
Id.
87
Englich et al., supra note 7, at 191.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id. Some of the participants in the studies “were junior lawyers from different German
courts who had recently received their law degree[s] and had acquired their first experiences
as judges in court.” Id. at 194. In “the German system of legal education, judges and
prosecutors receive identical training and alternate between both positions in the first years of
professional practice.” Id. at 190.
92
Birte Englich, Blind or Biased? Justitia’s Susceptibility to Anchoring Effects in the
Courtroom Based on Given Numerical Representations, 28 L. & POL’Y 497, 498 (2006)
(citation omitted); see also Englich et al., supra note 7.
93
Englich, supra note 92, at 500.
85
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random.94 In one of the studies, conducted by Englich, Mussweiler, and
Strack, the judges were specifically told that the prosecutor’s sentencing
suggestion was determined at random.95 Two related studies “went even
further to ensure that sentencing demands [by the prosecutors] were clearly
irrelevant.”96 Using this loaded die, the judges selected the sentencing
demands of the prosecutors themselves.97 “Even though this procedure
ensured that [the] participants were aware of the irrelevance of the sentencing
demands, their sentencing decisions were dramatically influenced by
them.”98 This remained true even among experienced judges.99
When “junior lawyers” were substituted for more experienced judges,
the only difference in the sentencing outcomes was that “experienced judges
in these studies felt much more certain about their—equally biased—
judgments.”100 Englich observed not only the anchoring effect on German
judges but the “blind spot” bias—the tendency to believe that one’s own
judgments are less biased than others.101 This research demonstrates “that
judgmental anchoring has a strong influence on criminal sentencing
decisions.”102 There is no reason to believe that American judges are immune
from blind spot bias. This bias makes it challenging for judges who are aware
of the anchoring effect in sentencing to admit that it affects their sentencing
as well as that of their colleagues.
The results of the German judge studies are troubling. The legal
professionals studied had “received extensive training in the critical
judgment domain, had considerable experience in making similar sentencing
decisions, and were motivated to provide an accurate judgment.”103
However, disturbingly, “they were [still] influenced by random numbers
even if they determined these numbers themselves by throwing dice.”104
Moreover, these studies “are the first to demonstrate that expert judgments
are influenced by clearly irrelevant anchors.”105 More concerning, not only
for sentencing judges but also for appellate judges who review appealed
sentences, “the present findings demonstrate that whereas experts are as
94

Id. passim; see also Englich et al., supra note 7.
Englich et al., supra note 7, at 197.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Englich, supra note 92, at 500.
100
Id. (internal citations omitted).
101
See Ehrlinger et al., supra note 4, at 681.
102
Englich & Mussweiler, supra note 19, at 1547.
103
Englich et al., supra note 7, at 198.
104
Id.
105
Id.
95
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susceptible to anchoring influences as novices, they feel more certain about
their judgments.”106 As Englich, Mussweiler, and Strack note in their
opening quote by Albert Einstein, “God does not play dice with the
universe.”107 But the German studies establish that the anchoring effect in
sentencing decisions should make all judges pause to consider if we are
unknowingly playing dice.
B. THE AMERICAN JUDGES STUDIES

In two empirical studies of sitting federal judges in the United States,
magistrate judges, and bankruptcy judges, and a third of state and federal
judges, researchers found that these judges, too, were susceptible to the
anchoring effect in their judicial decisions.108 Guthrie and his colleagues
observed: “Judges, it seems, are human. Like the rest of us, they use
heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment. Unlike the rest of
us, however, judges’ judgments can compromise the quality of justice that
the courts deliver.”109
1. The U.S. Magistrate Judges Study
The study of U.S. magistrate judges110 looked at whether five cognitive
biases—“anchoring, framing, hindsight bias, the representativeness heuristic,
106

Id.
Id. at 188.
108
Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 784–85 (focusing on U.S. magistrate judges); Rachlinski
et al., supra note 16, at 1230 (focusing on U.S. bankruptcy judges); Wistrich et al., supra note
81, at 1259.
109
Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 821 (internal footnote omitted).
110
Congress created the office of the United States magistrate judge in 1968. Federal
Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107–19 (1968) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631–39 (2012)). The Federal Magistrates Act authorizes magistrate judges to
conduct misdemeanor trials with the consent of the litigants, to serve as special masters in civil
matters, and to assist district judges with pretrial and post-trial functions and “additional duties
as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(a)(5), (b)(1)–(b)(3) (2012); see also Magistrate Judgeships, FED. JUDICIAL CTR.,
http://goo.gl/eYbvcO (last visited May 22, 2014). After several congressional amendments,
the role of the magistrate judge has greatly expanded. See Ira P. Robbins, Magistrate Judges,
Article III, and the Power to Preside over Federal Prisoner Section 2255 Proceedings, 2002
FED. CTS. L. REV. 2, 6. Magistrate judges have authority to conduct habeas proceedings,
subject to district court review, and to conduct civil trials with the consent of the litigants. See
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C) (2012); see also Judith Resnik, Building the Federal Judiciary
(Literally and Legally): The Monuments of Chief Justices Taft, Warren, and Rehnquist, 87
IND. L.J. 823, 877 (2012). “For the 12 month period ending September 30, 2010, Magistrate
Judges performed 353,847 judicial duties in civil cases, . . . including 169,134 [pretrial]
motions, 20,515 settlement conferences, and 52,322 other pretrial conferences.” About Us,
FED. MAGISTRATE JUDGES ASS’N, http://goo.gl/woa8TM (last visited May 22, 2014).
Magistrate judges “also performed 186,337 felony pretrial duties, including 98,115 motions,
107
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and egocentric biases[—]would influence the decision[s] . . . of a sample of
167 federal magistrate judges.”111 For the purposes of this Article, I focus
primarily on the anchoring results. In the study, while attending an annual
conference, 167 judges were each presented with a written description of a
hypothetical personal injury suit in which the amount of damages was the
only issue, the parties had waived a jury, and the parties were asked to award
the amount of damages they thought appropriate.112 The judges were
randomly assigned either an “anchor” or “no anchor” condition.113 The “no
anchor” group received only a hypothetical laying out the facts.114 They were
then simply asked, “How much would you award the plaintiff in
compensatory damages?”115 The “anchor” group received the same
hypothetical but was also given the anchor condition that “[t]he defendant
has moved for dismissal of the case, arguing that it does not meet the
jurisdictional minimum for a diversity case of $75,000.”116 The “anchor”
group was then asked to rule on the motion and was told, “If you deny the
motion, how much would you award the plaintiff in compensatory
damages?”117 The authors explain: “Because the plaintiff clearly had
38,921 pretrial conferences, and 2,222 evidentiary hearings.” Id. During this period,
“Magistrate Judges terminated 12,470 civil cases with litigants’ consent . . . [and] Magistrate
Judges conducted 333 civil jury trials and 171 civil trials without jury.” Id. In this twelvemonth period, “Magistrate Judges submitted 21,385 recommended dispositions in prisoner
cases (habeas corpus and civil rights),” and they “completed 4,225 reports and
recommendations in social security appeals.” Id. Magistrate judges are Article I judicial
officers who are appointed by a majority vote of the district judges of each district court to
serve in a United States district court for a renewable term of eight years. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 631(a), (e). In 2011, there were 527 full-time magistrate judge positions, as well as 41 parttime magistrate judges, and 3 combination clerk-of-court/magistrate judges. About Us, FED.
MAGISTRATE JUDGES ASS’N, supra.
111
Guthrie et al., supra note 2, at 778. The sample of 167 magistrate judges represented
about one-third of the 519 magistrate judges then serving. Id. at 787.
112
Id. at 790–91. The judges were given the following hypothetical:
Suppose that you are presiding over a personal injury lawsuit that is in federal court based on
diversity jurisdiction. The defendant is a major company in the package delivery business. The
plaintiff was badly injured after being struck by one of the defendant’s trucks when its brakes
failed at a traffic light. Subsequent investigations revealed that the braking system on the truck
was faulty, and that the truck had not been properly maintained by the defendant. The plaintiff
was hospitalized for several months, and has been in a wheelchair ever since, unable to use his
legs. He had been earning a good living as a free-lance electrician and had built up a steady base
of loyal customers. The plaintiff has requested damages for lost wages, hospitalization, and pain
and suffering, but has not specified an amount. Both parties have waived their rights to a jury trial.

Id. at 790.
113
Id.
114
Id. For the full text of the hypothetical, see supra note 112.
115
Id. at 790–91.
116
Id. at 791.
117
Id.
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incurred damages greater than $75,000, the motion was meritless.
Nevertheless, we hypothesized that the $75,000 would serve as an anchor,
resulting in lower damage awards from those judges who first ruled on the
motion.”118
Indeed, the anchor of ruling on the meritless motion “had a large effect
on [the] damage awards.”119 The judges in the “no anchor” group awarded
the plaintiff an average of $1,249,000, while the judges in the “anchor” group
awarded an average of $882,000.120 “[A]sking the judges to rule on [the]
frivolous motion [to dismiss (the “anchor” group)] depressed average
damage awards by more than $350,000 (or 29.4%).”121 Because damage
award data presented by a mean award can be skewed by a few large awards,
the authors also presented the data by median and quartile statistics, here
duplicated in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Results of Asking Magistrate Judges to Award Compensatory Damages:
Quartile Results122
Condition
No Anchor
Anchor

First Quartile
(25th Percentile)
$500,000
$288,000

Second Quartile
(Median)
$1,000,000
$882,000

Third Quartile
(75th Percentile)
$1,925,000
$1,000,000

From Figure 5, the authors noted that the motion to dismiss in the
“[a]nchor” group “had a pronounced effect on the judges at all response
levels.”123 Interestingly, for purposes of this Article, Guthrie and colleagues
pontificated that “[t]he potentially pernicious effects of anchoring also
suggest a source of error in both the civil and criminal justice systems.”124
2. The U.S. Bankruptcy Judges Study
After studying magistrate judges, Guthrie and colleagues proceeded to
study bankruptcy judges.125 The primary purpose of this study was to look
at whether specialization in judging leads to superior decisionmaking.126
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 792 tbl.1.
Id. at 792.
Id. at 793.
See Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1227, 1230.
Id. at 1228–30.
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Generalist trial judges can breathe a huge sigh of relief;127 for the purposes of
this Article, I focus on the bankruptcy judges study’s look at the anchoring
effect on their judgments (although the study took into account several
heuristics).128 Like the magistrate judge study, the 113 bankruptcy judges in
the study were recruited at one of their annual seminars in 2004.129
To test the influence of the cognitive bias of anchoring on bankruptcy
judges, the authors constructed a “Truck Driver” problem.130 The problem
asked the bankruptcy judges “to set an interest rate on a restructured loan in
a Chapter 13 proceeding” based on the then-recent Supreme Court ruling in
Till v. SCS Credit Corp.131 In Till, the Court rejected a creditor’s argument
that the 21% interest rate on the current loan should be the presumptive rate
on the restructured loan.132 Instead, the Court adopted the debtor’s view that
the current prime rate adjusted for the debtor’s greater risk of default should
be used.133
The bankruptcy judges participating in the Truck Driver problem were
assigned randomly, unbeknownst to them, to either a “control” group with no
anchor or an “anchor” group.134 The judges in the control group were
informed that the parties in the Truck Driver problem agreed under Till that
the “original contract interest rate is irrelevant to the court’s
determination.”135 The judges in the “anchor” group received the same
sentence, but the words “of 21%” were inserted between the words “rate” and
“is irrelevant.”136 All judges in both groups were then asked to set the
restructured loan interest rate.137 Specifically, they were all asked: “Because
the parties disagree on the appropriate annual interest rate, it is up to you to
select one. What annual interest rate would you select?”138
The authors of the study “found that the initial interest rate affected
judges’ assessments.”139 The judges in the “control” group set a mean
interest rate of 6.33%, while the judges in the “anchor” group set a mean

127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 1230–31, 1257.
Id. at 1233–37.
Id. at 1231.
Id. at 1233.
541 U.S. 465 (2004); Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233.
Till, 541 U.S. at 478–80; Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233.
Till, 541 U.S. at 478–80; Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1233–34.
Rachlinski et al., supra note 16, at 1235.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interest rate .8% higher at 7.13%.140 The authors concluded that because
some judges merely selected the prime rate with no adjustments, the effect of
the anchoring was understated.141 With those judges removed, the difference
became almost 1.5%.142 Both the 0.8% and 1.5% were statistically
significant, and while the difference might seem small, the authors noted that
even this difference on a modest loan of $10,000 dollars “can mean hundreds
or even thousands of dollars over the life of the loan.”143
The authors then compared their results with the results of the magistrate
judges study, using comparative standard deviations for the anchoring and
varying exercises between the magistrate and bankruptcy judges.144 The
magnitude of the anchoring effect was similar but slightly smaller for the
bankruptcy judges, and the authors observed: “we cannot conclude from this
that bankruptcy judges are less susceptible than generalist judges to the
anchoring effect.”145
3. One Final Anchoring Study—Information Obtained in Settlement
Conferences
The same authors of the two previous studies also conducted a third
judicial study, which in part looks at the role of anchoring in settlement
discussions with judges.146 The data collected on this part of the study came
from judges attending five different judicial education conferences.147
Portions of the study examined whether judges were influenced or
“anchored” by inadmissible information (i.e., the monetary demand by
plaintiff’s counsel in a settlement conference) when the same judge later was
asked to decide the amount of damages to be awarded at trial.148 The judges
were presented with an “Assessment of Damages” scenario involving “a 31year-old high school teacher who lost his right arm after he was hit by a truck
140

Id.
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1237.
145
Id. The authors did find something of interest in their demographic data: “Republican
judges were more likely than their Democratic counterparts to make decisions that favored
creditors.” Id. at 1258. However, political party affiliation did not affect susceptibility to the
anchoring effect. Id. at 1257–58.
146
Wistrich et al., supra note 81, at 1286.
147
Id. at 1279, 1285 tbl.1. In the study, 62 magistrate judges came from conferences in
either San Diego or Minneapolis; 71 state trial court judges came from a large urban court
(they were promised the identity of the jurisdiction would not be revealed); and 105 state trial
court judges came from Maricopa County, Arizona. Id. at 1279–80. For more demographic
information about the judges in the study and the study procedures, see id. at 1279–89.
148
Id. at 1286.
141
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driven by one of the defendant’s employees.”149 The materials indicated that
the judge agreed to hold a last-minute settlement conference on the eve of
trial, but the conference was unsuccessful, so the case proceeded to trial. 150
Judges in the control group did not receive a specific dollar request from
plaintiff’s counsel in materials describing the settlement conference, while
the other judges learned that plaintiff’s counsel had demanded either
$175,000 (the low anchor) or $10,000,000 (the high anchor) to settle.151
The judges with the low anchor awarded a mean of $612,000, while the
judges in the matched control group awarded a mean award of nearly
$1,400,000; the judges with the high anchor awarded a mean award over
$2,200,000, while the judges in the matched control group awarded a mean
award of $808,000.152 Thus, the “low anchor” group produced a mean award
56.29% lower than the matched control group and the “high anchor” group
produced a mean award 172.28% greater than the matched control group.
The authors concluded: “The anchors appear to have influenced the judges’
assessments of the appropriate amount of damages to award. Relative to the
judges assigned to the control conditions, the high-anchor judges gave
substantially higher awards and the low-anchor judges gave substantially
lower awards.”153 Here, the powerful effects of the high and low anchors,
derived using anchors that are at least relevant to the judges’ assessments
about the amount of damages, are “in contrast to the anchors that
psychologists typically provide in their studies of anchoring . . . .”154
4. Summary of Cognitive “Anchoring Effect” Studies
The studies of judges—German, American, experienced, generalist, and
specialist—clearly establish that judges, like the general population, are
strongly impacted by the anchoring effect. This remains true even with
random and unrelated anchors, like the effect of rolling dice on the length of
sentences. When related and plausible anchors are used, the gravitational
pull of the anchors is even stronger and has a greater effect on judges’
assessments and judgments. Before turning to the anchoring effect and
sentencing under the current advisory Guidelines regime, the next part of this
Article provides a brief overview of federal sentencing.

149
150
151
152
153
154

Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1288–89.
Id.
Id. at 1289–90.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
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III. THE FEDERAL SENTENCING REVOLUTION
A. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

In its new report to Congress on the impact of United States v. Booker,155
the United States Sentencing Commission’s (USSC) “sentencing data
analyses spanned a broad time frame, from October 1995 through September
2011.”156 This data spanned four periods: “the Koon period (June 13, 1996
through April 30, 2003), the PROTECT Act period (May 1, 2003 through
June 24, 2004), the Booker period (January 12, 2005 through December 10,
2007), and the Gall period (December 11, 2007 through September 30,
2011).”157 The Commission chose these periods because they reflected
“Supreme Court decisions and legislation that influenced federal sentencing
in fundamental ways.”158 The latter two periods, Booker and Gall, are
particularly important because they reflect the current state of federal
sentencing and are thus described in greater detail.
Characterizing the first period, the Supreme Court in Koon v. United
States established that district court departure decisions under the Guidelines
were entitled to deference on appeal by adopting an abuse of discretion
standard of review and rejecting a de novo standard.159 The second period
referred to by the USSC is the PROTECT Act period. In 2003, Congress
enacted the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation
of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act)160—which restricted the use of
departures by sentencing courts and changed the standard of review for
departures to de novo.161 However, looking at important USSC data spanning
155
156
157
158

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. A.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3. The Commission describes these four periods as follows:

Specifically, in United States v. Koon, the Supreme Court defined the level of deference due to
district courts’ decisions to sentence outside the guideline range and determined that such decisions
should be reviewed for abuse of discretion. In passing the PROTECT Act nearly seven years later,
Congress restricted district courts’ discretion to impose sentences outside the guideline range, and
required that courts of appeals review such decisions de novo, or without any deference to the
district court’s decision. In Booker, the Supreme Court struck down two statutory provisions in
the SRA that made the guidelines mandatory, and also defined the standard of review for sentences
on appeal. In Gall v. United States, the Court further defined the appellate standard of review.

Id. (footnotes omitted).
159
518 U.S. 81, 96–100 (1996).
160
Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
161
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. A.
The PROTECT Act included several directives to the Commission, among them a directive to
promulgate guideline amendments “to ensure that the incidence of downward departures are [sic]
substantially reduced.” The Commission responded to these directives and statutory changes with
two amendments implementing the PROTECT Act’s direct amendments to the guidelines and an
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all four periods is essential to understand the nature and gravitational pull of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as cognitive anchors for sentencing
judges.
B. THE BOOKER REVOLUTION

For nearly a decade, federal sentencing law has been in a period of
fundamental and “profound change.”162 The so-called Booker163 revolution
marked the Maginot line between the mandatory sentencing guideline regime
(in place since the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA) went into effect on
November 1, 1987)164 and the new post-Booker advisory Guideline
sentencing scheme.165 Booker, in short, held the Sentencing Guidelines

eight-part emergency amendment that modified nine guideline provisions. The amendment also
created the early disposition departure (or “fast track”) called for in the PROTECT Act at §[ ]5K3.1
(Early Disposition Programs) (Policy Statement) and a new guideline at §[ ]1A3.1 (Authority)
setting forth the statutory authority for the Commission and the guidelines. The amendments’
overall effect was to limit the availability of departures by prohibiting certain factors as grounds
for departure, restricting the availability of certain departures, narrowing when certain permitted
departures were appropriate, and limiting the extent of departures.

Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
162
Scott Michelman & Jay Rorty, Doing Kimbrough Justice: Implementing Policy
Disagreements with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1083, 1083
(2012).
163
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
164
See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 2 (n.d.), available at http://goo.gl/z6c5bE. (last visited May 22,
2014).
165
Actually, the seeds of the post-Booker sentencing revolution were sown in the
somewhat obscure case of Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). In Jones, the Supreme
Court interpreted a federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1988), to define three
separate offenses rather than a single offense with potentially three different maximum
sentences triggered by aggravating factors that were not found by a jury. Id. at 251–52. This
interpretation avoided the potential due process and Sixth Amendment constitutional issues
identified by the Court. Id. at 239–52. The following year, in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466 (2000), the Supreme Court answered the question raised, but not decided, in Jones
and held:
In sum, our reexamination of our cases in this area, and of the history upon which they rely,
confirms the opinion that we expressed in Jones. Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 490. Then, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court extended the
Apprendi rationale to invalidate a state mandatory sentencing regime because the Sixth
Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited a state sentencing judge from enhancing a criminal
sentence three years above the fifty-three-month maximum sentence based on facts not
decided by a jury or admitted by a defendant, in this case, that Ralph Howard Blakely acted
with deliberate cruelty. Id. at 298, 313–14. Blakely, thus, refined the Apprendi rule by
holding:
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unconstitutional under the Apprendi-Blakely rationale because the sentencing
judge enhanced Freddie Booker’s sentence beyond the 262-month sentence
he could have imposed (based on facts the jury found beyond a reasonable
doubt) to 360 months based on facts the judge found by a preponderance of
the evidence.166 The Booker remedy did two things. First, it severed and
excised the provision of the SRA that made the Guidelines mandatory and
binding on federal judges, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1).167 The Court noted that
had Congress made the Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than
mandatory, the SRA would fall “outside the scope of Apprendi’s
requirement.”168 Second, the Court severed and excised 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e),
which “sets forth standards of review on appeal, including de novo review of
departures from the applicable Guidelines range.”169 Thus, Booker made
clear that mandatory guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial
by jury by extending the Court’s prior holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to
the United States Sentencing Guidelines.170 Thus, the Court answered the
first question presented in the case—“Whether the Sixth Amendment is
violated by the imposition of an enhanced sentence under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines based on the sentencing judge’s determination of a
fact (other than a prior conviction) that was not found by the jury or admitted
by the defendant”171—in the affirmative. The second part of Booker, the
remedial portion, held that the proper remedy for the Sixth Amendment
violation was to make the Guidelines advisory by severing two provisions
that made the Guidelines mandatory.172
C. THE POST-BOOKER SENTENCING REGIME

Booker clearly gave federal sentencing judges more discretion, but not
much clarity on how to apply the § 3553(a) factors. “Mandatory Guideline
sentencing was out. The seven factors of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (§ 3553

In other words, the relevant “statutory maximum” is not the maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional
findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow, the jury
has not found all the facts “which the law makes essential to the punishment,” and the judge
exceeds his proper authority.

Id. at 303–04 (citation omitted). “Blakely made Booker’s constitutional holding all but
inevitable . . . .” Michelman & Rorty, supra note 162, at 1093.
166
Booker, 543 U.S. at 227, 243–44.
167
Id. at 258–59.
168
Id. at 259.
169
Id. (citation omitted).
170
Id. at 243–44.
171
Id. at 229 n.1.
172
Id. at 245.
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factors) were in.”173 The Court in Rita v. United States described the § 3553
factors as:
That provision tells the sentencing judge to consider (1) offense and offender
characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic aims of sentencing,
namely, (a) “just punishment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c) incapacitation, (d)
rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing Guidelines; (5)
Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted
disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.174

Additionally, Rita reinforces that the § 3553 factors also mandate “the
sentencing judge to ‘impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with’ the basic aims of sentencing as set out above.”175
The central issue in Rita was whether a presumption of reasonableness,
adopted by several federal courts of appeals as part of their post-Booker
“reasonableness” review, attached to a sentence on appeal that was within the
Sentencing Guidelines.176 The Court held that the courts of appeals were free
to adopt a presumption of reasonableness in part because by the time they
review “a within-Guidelines sentence[,] . . . both the sentencing judge and
the [USSC] will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence
in the particular case. That double determination significantly increases the
likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one.”177 The Court noted: “We
repeat that the presumption before us is an appellate court presumption.
Given our explanation in Booker that appellate ‘reasonableness’ review
merely asks whether the trial court abused its discretion, the presumption
applies only on appellate review.”178
But is that how sentencing judges have implemented Booker? Justice
Stephen Breyer, the author of the majority opinion in Rita, wondered as
much: “Rita may be correct that the presumption will encourage sentencing
judges to impose Guideline sentences.”179 Justice John Paul Stevens,
concurring in Rita, candidly recognized that “I am not blind to the fact that,
as a practical matter, many federal judges continued to treat the Guidelines
as virtually mandatory after our decision in Booker.”180 In his Rita
concurring opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia, who was in the majority on the
Booker holding that the mandatory Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment, but dissented as to the Booker remedy, noted: “The only way to
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180

Michelman & Rorty, supra note 162, at 1095.
551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007).
Id. at 348.
Id. at 341.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 354.
Id. at 366 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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assure district courts that they can deviate from the advisory Guidelines, and
to ensure that judge-found facts are never legally essential to the sentence, is
to prohibit appellate courts from reviewing the substantive sentencing
choices made by district courts.”181 Finally, even Justice David Souter in his
Rita dissent expressed grave concerns about district court judges’
“substantial gravitational pull” to the now-advisory Guidelines.182 Justice
Souter warned that “a presumption of Guidelines reasonableness would tend
to produce Guidelines sentences almost as regularly as mandatory Guidelines
had done” and that this “would open the door to undermining Apprendi itself,
and this is what has happened today.”183 Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Souter
raised these very concerns without explicitly considering the powerful
evidence of the anchoring effect!
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF GALL V. UNITED STATES

In Gall v. United States, the Court reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision, which had in turn reversed the trial
court judge for varying from the bottom of the Guidelines range of thirty
months to probation.184 The trial court judge, in fashioning the sentence,
relied on the facts that Gall was a recent college graduate, who several years
earlier had voluntarily withdrawn from his limited seven-month involvement
in an ecstasy drug trafficking conspiracy, started his own successful business,
lacked a criminal history, and had the support of his family and friends.185
The Court took serious issue with the Eighth Circuit’s view that a sentence
outside the advisory Guidelines range must be supported by justifications that
are proportional to the extent of the variance.186 The Court also rejected the
Eighth Circuit’s view that the thirty-month variance at issue was
“extraordinary” and must be supported by extraordinary circumstances.187
The Court held that neither of the Eighth Circuit’s views was consistent with
the Court’s remedial opinion in Booker.188 The Court held:
[W]hile the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended
Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—
whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a

181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

Id. at 373 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 390 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id.
552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007).
Id. at 43–46.
Id. at 45–53.
Id. at 46–48.
Id. at 46–49.
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deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. We also hold that the sentence imposed by the
experienced District Judge in this case was reasonable.189

The Court explained: “If the sentence is within the Guidelines range, the
appellate court may, but is not required to, apply a presumption of
reasonableness.”190 Critically, the Court held that “if the sentence is outside
the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of
unreasonableness.”191 Moreover, even “[t]he fact that the appellate court
might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”192
The Court also explained that trial court judges are “in a superior
position to find facts,” determine the credibility of the witnesses, apply the
§ 3553(a) factors, and “gain[] insights not conveyed by the record.”193
Quoting from its earlier opinion in Koon, the Court emphasized the historic
role of a federal sentencing judge: “It has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted
person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings
that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment
to ensue.”194 The Court further observed, “[I]t is not for the Court of Appeals
to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the
sentence reasonable.”195 Rather, under the more deferential “abuse-ofdiscretion review, the Court of Appeals should have given due deference to
the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable decision that the §[ ]3553(a)
factors, on the whole, justified the sentence.”196
Thus, Gall gave federal sentencing judges wider discretion to apply the
§ 3553(a) factors and to achieve the overarching principle of federal
sentencing that every federal district court judge “shall impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes” of
sentencing.197

189

Id. at 41.
Id. at 51.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. (quoting Brief Amici Curiae of Federal Public & Community Defenders & National
Ass’n of Federal Defenders in Support of Petitioner at 16, Gall, 552 U.S. 38 (No. 06-7949)).
194
Id. at 52 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
195
Id. at 59.
196
Id. at 59–60.
197
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
190
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E. THE PRE-SENTENCING AND SENTENCING PROCESS

After a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty by a jury or judge in a
trial, the U.S. Probation Office prepares a presentence report (PSR).198 The
requirements for the presentence investigation and the preparation of the PSR
are contained in Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
key provisions of the Rule require the probation officer to apply and compute
the advisory Guidelines range by calculating the defendant’s offense level
and criminal history, stating the resulting sentencing range, and identifying
all relevant sentencing factors, including the defendant’s history,
characteristics, and any prior criminal record.199 The PSR is then disclosed
to the parties,200 and they are given time to object in writing to anything in
the PSR, including the calculation and proposed advisory Sentencing
Guidelines range.201 At sentencing, the judge resolves any contested advisory
Guidelines or fact issues, takes any evidence, and hears any witnesses offered
by the parties.202 Before imposing a sentence, the judge must allow both the
defense attorney and the attorney for the government an opportunity to be
heard and “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant
to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence . . . .”203
The Supreme Court in Gall described the proper procedure for postBooker sentencing.204 First, “a district court should begin all sentencing
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”205
The Guidelines ranges are contained in a sentencing table or grid consisting
of “43 offense levels on a vertical axis and 6 criminal history categories on a
horizontal axis that intersect to form a sentencing grid with 258 cells that
each contain an advisory guideline sentencing range, except for the 6 cells
for offense level 43 that have a single sentence: life.”206 The judge then
should give “both parties an opportunity to argue for whatever sentence they
deem appropriate . . . .”207 Next, “the district judge should then consider all

198

The percentage of defendants who plead guilty has remained constant over the years:
the Koon period was 95.0%; the PROTECT Act period was 95.4%; the Booker period was
95.3%; and the Gall period until 2011 was 96.5%. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10,
pt. A, at 58.
199
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
200
Id. 32(e).
201
Id. 32(f).
202
Id. 32(i).
203
Id. 32(i)(2)–(4).
204
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007).
205
Id. at 49. (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347–48 (2007)).
206
United States v. Newhouse, 919 F. Supp. 2d 955, 957 n.1 (N.D. Iowa 2013) (Bennett,
J.) (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 9, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing tbl.).
207
Gall, 552 U.S. at 49.
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of the § 3553(a) factors . . . .”208 The judge “must make an individualized
assessment based on the facts presented.”209 If the judge “decides that an
outside-Guidelines sentence is warranted, he must consider the extent of the
deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to
support the degree of the variance.”210 Finally, the judge “must adequately
explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to
promote the perception of fair sentencing.”211
IV. POST-BOOKER SENTENCING AND THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF THE
GUIDELINES RANGE
Were Justices Breyer, Scalia, and Souter’s concerns correct in Rita that
an appellate presumption of reasonableness would create a gravitational pull
towards the now-advisory Guidelines so that federal judges would sentence
just like they had when the Guidelines were mandatory? In discussing that
gravitational pull, one scholar and policy analyst suggested that “the
guidelines’ recommendation serves as a psychological ‘anchor,’ which
appears to simplify or obviate the daunting task of evaluating the seriousness
of the offense, the dangerousness of the offender, and other considerations
relevant to the statutory purposes.”212 The scholar notes, “It is no surprise
that judges would be grateful for a recommendation that purports to take into
account the difficult considerations that bear on sentencing.”213 Thus, like
wearing old shoes or old blue jeans, judges may just feel more comfortable
relying on the Guidelines. Does anchoring by the actual Sentencing
Guidelines range either discourage or minimize the extent of applying the
other § 3553(a) factors and downward variances?

208

Id. at 49–50.
Id. at 50.
210
Id.
211
Id. Contra Amy Baron-Evans & Thomas W. Hillier, II, The Commission’s Legislative
Agenda to Restore Mandatory Guidelines, 25 FED. SENT’G REP. 293 (2013) (scathingly
discussing the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 2010 promulgation of its three-step Guideline,
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1 (2010), allegedly incorporating the holding
of Gall). This blistering analysis establishes that this new Guideline is totally inconsistent
with Gall, and contrary to the claim by the Commission, it is also inconsistent with all of the
holdings of the courts of appeals and likely unconstitutional. See generally id.
212
Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”: Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal
Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 689 (2011) (footnote omitted).
213
Id. Yet another reason for the gravitational pull of the Guidelines is the standard in
some circuits that within-Guidelines sentences require a lesser explanation by the sentencing
judge than a sentence outside the Guidelines range. See, e.g., United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d
984, 990–94 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc); United States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 331 n.36 (3d
Cir. 2007).
209
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In looking at very recent and comprehensive data from the USSC,
presented here in Figure 6, it is fascinating to observe how little the increased
discretion of federal district court judges post-Booker and Gall has impacted
the frequency and extent of non-Guidelines variances.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. C (citation omitted).
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The gravitational pull of the Guidelines appears to be so strong that the
change from mandatory to advisory Guidelines has had little to no impact on
the average length of federal sentences. Indeed, as shown in Figure 6, the
average sentence for all federal sentences imposed215 in the Koon era was
forty-nine months,216 while the average sentence for all federal sentences
imposed217 in the Gall era is also forty-nine months.218 The average nongovernment sponsored, below range sentence in the Koon era was thirty-two
months, while the average during the Gall era actually increased by 68% to
forty-seven months.219 The average non-government sponsored, belowrange sentence occurred 15.4% of the time in the Koon era and increased to
only 17.4% in the Gall era.220 Finally, if judges were actually consistently
exercising discretion using the § 3553(a) factors to vary downward, one
would expect to see a substantial increase in the average extent of reductions
for non-government sponsored, below-range sentences for all offenses from
the Koon era to the Gall era. However, the actual average extent of
reductions was more modest. The average percent reduction and number of
months reduced in the Koon era was 41.8% and seventeen months; in the
PROTECT Act era 40.0% and seventeen months; in the Booker era 39.1%
and twenty months; and in the Gall era 40.7% and twenty-one months.221
Thus, the impact of the greater discretion given federal judges under Booker
and Gall has only minimally affected non-Guidelines sentencing. As the
D.C. Circuit has observed, “It is hardly surprising that most federal sentences
fall within Guidelines ranges even after Booker—indeed, the actual impact
of Booker on sentencing has been minor.”222
As Figures 7 and 8 demonstrate, the post-Booker broadening of judicial
discretion has had virtually no impact on mitigating the harshness of
sentencing under advisory Guidelines rather than mandatory Guidelines. The
average sentence imposed in terms of months compared to the average
Guidelines minimum has remained virtually constant from the Koon period
through the Gall period.

215

Id. at 81.
Id. at 19.
217
Id. at 81.
218
Id. at 19.
219
Id.
220
Id.
221
Id.
222
United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing U.S. SENTENCING
COMM’N, FINAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 1 tbl.1 (2008); U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V. BOOKER ON FEDERAL
SENTENCING 57 (2006)).
216
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Figure 7
Average Guideline Minimum and Sentence Imposed
All Offenses, Fiscal Years 1996–2011223

Figure 8
Percent Difference Between Average Guidelines Minimum
and Sentence Imposed, All Offense, Fiscal Years 1996–2011224

223
224

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 10, pt. C (citation omitted).
Id.
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Legal scholars have also recognized the marginal impact of Booker on
the length of sentences.225 Ryan Scott has observed that the expected postBooker revolution “did not prompt immediate changes in sentencing
outcomes.”226 In fact, the average length of sentences, even in drug
trafficking offenses, increased for several years post-Booker.227 Scott
concluded: “The rate of below-guideline sentencing jumped, but quickly
leveled out, and the change was hardly ‘earth-shattering.’
Many
commentators lamented that, far from ushering in a revolution, the decision
turned out to be a dud.”228 I now turn to the most likely explanation for this
post-Booker dud.
V. ANCHORING AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
It is hardly surprising that the United States Sentencing Guidelines still
act as a hulking anchor for most judges.229 After all, is this not exactly what
Congress intended when it passed the SRA and created the mandatory
sentencing Guidelines? Even though the Guidelines are now advisory, as a
result of the Rita presumption of reasonableness, the D.C. Circuit observed,
“judges are more likely to sentence within the Guidelines in order to avoid
the increased scrutiny that is likely to result from imposing a sentence outside
the Guidelines.”230 In addition to the effect of the Rita presumption, the D.C.
Circuit has also noted, “[p]ractically speaking, applicable Sentencing
Guidelines provide a starting point or ‘anchor’ for judges and are likely to
influence the sentences judges impose.”231 As one judge on the Eleventh
225

See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Tweaking Booker: Advisory Guidelines in the Federal
System, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 341, 349 (2006) (noting that “the Booker decision appears to have
only slightly mitigated the rigidity and severity of the federal sentencing system” and “data on
post-Booker sentencing outcomes released by the Commission reveal only relatively small
changes in the patterns of sentencing outcomes” (footnotes omitted)).
226
Ryan W. Scott, Inter-judge Sentencing Disparity After Booker: A First Look, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1, 14 (2010).
227
Id. (footnote omitted).
228
Id. at 14–15 (footnotes omitted).
229
Daniel M. Isaacs, Note, Baseline Framing in Sentencing, 121 YALE L.J. 426, 428
(2011). “The robust research on cognitive biases and framing effects suggests that judges do
commit cognitive errors while sentencing and that sentencing baselines anchor sentences.” Id.
at 449.
230
United States v. Turner, 548 F.3d 1094, 1099 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
231
Id.; see also United States v. Robertson, 662 F.3d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing
Turner and other cases); United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1321 (11th Cir. 2011)
(citing Turner); United States v. Doyle, 621 F. Supp. 2d 345, 351 (W.D. Va. 2009) (same);
United States v. Kladek, 651 F. Supp. 2d 992, 996 (D. Minn. 2009) (same). But see United
States v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 193, 204–05 (4th Cir. 2010) (Goodwin, C.J., concurring and
dissenting). Chief Judge Joseph Goodwin of the Southern District of West Virginia criticized
the majority for giving too much weight to the Turner anchoring language: “Relying upon the
D.C. Circuit’s characterization of the Guidelines as an ‘important anchor for a sentencing
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Circuit Court of Appeals has noted: “Not only have district courts now
become used to relying on them, but the Guidelines inevitably have a
considerable anchoring effect on a district court’s analysis.”232 Indeed,
former Federal District Court Judge Nancy Gertner, after briefly mentioning
the potential role of cognitive anchoring in federal sentencing, observed: “In
effect, the 300-odd page Guideline Manual provides ready-made anchors.”233
Gertner continued: “District judges have gotten the message. Advisory or
not, ‘compliance’ with the Guidelines is high.”234 Most recently, Justice
Sonia Sotomayor, in dicta in her Peugh v. United States majority opinion,
wrote: “The post-Booker federal sentencing scheme aims to achieve
uniformity by ensuring that sentencing decisions are anchored by the
Guidelines and that they remain a meaningful benchmark through the process
of appellate review.”235 Just four days later, Judge Guido Calabresi wrote in
a concurring opinion in United States v. Ingram,236 after citing to several of
the “anchoring effect” studies described earlier:
It is important to distinguish the guidelines’ intended, salutary effect—promoting
consistency and proportionality in sentencing—from the unintended anchoring effect
that the guidelines can exert. Proper reliance on the guidelines is not only rational, but
legally compelled. As our court has stated, en banc, “sentencing judges, certainly, are
not free to ignore the Guidelines. . . . The Guidelines provide the starting point and the
initial benchmark for sentencing, and district courts must remain cognizant of them
throughout the sentencing process.” Anchoring leads to cognitive error not insofar as
judges intentionally use the guidelines in an advisory fashion, but instead when “judges
irrationally assign too much weight to the guidelines range, just because it offers some
initial numbers.”237

It is sentencing judges’ extraordinarily difficult task to distinguish
between Justice Sotomayor’s intended “anchoring” of the Guidelines and
Judge Calabresi’s concern that the anchoring effect will lead to irrational and
subconscious weighting of the Guidelines that calls out for a solution.

judge,’ the majority necessarily concludes that the Guidelines are more of a requirement for
district courts to follow than advice to be considered.” Id. at 204 (quoting Turner, 548 F.3d
at 1099). The Turner majority thus gives more weight to the Guidelines than the Sixth
Amendment permits.
232
United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091, 1105 n.5 (11th Cir. 2009) (Barkett, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
233
Nancy Gertner, What Yogi Berra Teaches About Post-Booker Sentencing, 115 YALE
L.J. POCKET PART 137, 138 (2006).
234
Id. at 140.
235
133 S. Ct. 2072, 2083 (2013) (holding that a defendant sentenced under higher
Guidelines than those in effect at the time of the offense violated the Ex Post Facto Clause).
236
721 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2013).
237
Id. at 40 n.2 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180,
189 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Scott, supra note 226, at 45).
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For federal district court judges with twenty-six years or fewer years of
experience on the bench (75% of all sitting federal district court judges), the
Guidelines have been with them their entire judicial career.238 Is it any
wonder they remain anchored to them?239 Even the structure of the PSR
promotes anchoring to the Guidelines range. In either the traditional PSR or
the newer version increasingly used by most courts,240 the computation of the
Guidelines range is included in Part A of the PSR, “The Offense.” The
Guidelines calculation is preceded by only the cover page, which provides
basic data about the defendant, like name, address, citizenship, the statement
of the offense, and the offense conduct. The calculation of the Guidelines
range is followed by Part B of the PSR, which includes, in great detail, the
defendant’s complete criminal history. Part C includes all the offender
characteristics, like personal and family data, physical condition, mental and
emotional health, substance abuse, educational, vocational, and special skills,
and financial condition—the grist for most of the § 3553(a) factors. Part D
includes sentencing options. Thus, before a judge learns virtually anything
about the defendant’s personal history and unique personal characteristics,
the advisory Guidelines range forms an anchor for the sentence.
When asked, federal district court judges have expressed considerable
dissatisfaction with the Sentencing Guidelines. A comprehensive survey of
federal district court judges in 2010 by the USSC reported a plethora of
criticism of the current Guidelines. By way of a few examples, only 22% of
judges surveyed strongly agreed “the federal sentencing guidelines have
increased fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing.”241 Sixty-six
percent of the judges surveyed thought that the “safety valve” in drug cases
was too limited and should be expanded to offenders with two or three
criminal history points.242 Sixty-nine percent of the judges surveyed thought
that the safety valve should be expanded to all offenses with a mandatory
minimum.243 Seventy-one percent of the judges surveyed disagreed with the
lack of safety valve status for receipt of child pornography. 244 Eighty-four
238
There are 1,043 sitting federal district court judges: 606 are on active status, and 437
are on senior status. Of the sitting judges, 794 judges (574 active and 220 senior) were
appointed after the effective date of the Guidelines, November 1, 1987. See Biographical
Directory of Federal Judges, 1789-Present, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., http://goo.gl/Bw0lL4 (follow
“Select research categories” hyperlink) (last visited May 22, 2014).
239
But see Scott, supra note 226, at 42–44.
240
The newer version is known as “PACTS v.6.0/PSX.” PACTS stands for Probation and
Pretrial Services Case Management Software.
241
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES
JANUARY 2010 THROUGH MARCH 2010, at tbl.17 (2010).
242
Id. at tbl.2.
243
Id.
244
Id.
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percent of the judges surveyed disagreed with considering acquitted conduct
as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes.245 Sixty-eight percent of the
judges surveyed disagreed that uncharged conduct only referenced in the PSR
could be considered relevant conduct.246 More than half of the judges
surveyed thought that the Guidelines should be amended to allow judges to
reduce a defendant’s sentence for substantial assistance, even if the
Government does not make a motion.247
When asked if certain factors were relevant to variances from the
Guidelines, 60% or more of the judges responded that the following factors
were ordinarily relevant: age, mental condition, emotional condition,
physical condition, employment record, family ties and responsibilities,
stress related to military service, civic, charitable or public service, prior good
works, diminished capacity, voluntary disclosure of the offense, aberrant
behavior, exceptional efforts to fulfill restitution obligations, and undue
influence related to affection, relationship, or fear of other offenders.248 This
is significant because the vast majority of these factors were not available for
judges to consider prior to Booker unless they were present to an
extraordinary degree. Furthermore, federal district court judges have wide
latitude and discretion to determine how much weight to give any of the
§ 3553(a) factors and to attach greater weight to one factor over others.249
However, as Figures 7 and 8 illustrate, judges do not now use these
discretionary factors, each part of the § 3553(a) non-Guidelines factors, to
any meaningful extent to reduce sentences. This strongly suggests that the
Guidelines act as a powerful anchor in current federal judicial sentencing.
In addition to the USSC survey, federal judges have strongly criticized
the Guidelines in scholarly journals, indicating, for example, that the
Guidelines “need substantial change, if not complete rejection”250 and
245

Id. at tbl.5.
Id.
247
Id. at tbl.15.
248
Id. at tbl.13.
249
United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636–39 (11th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Gasaway, 684 F.3d 804, 808 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679–80
(4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Busara, 551 F.3d 669, 673–74 (7th Cir. 2008).
250
Myron H. Bright, Judge Gerald W. Heaney: A True Son of the Soil, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1101, 1103 (1997) (“Today almost all federal judges agree that these guidelines need
substantial change, if not complete rejection.”); see also Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing
Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, 207 N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11, 1992, at 1 (claiming “virtually everyone
who is associated with the federal justice system” deems the Guidelines a “dismal failure”);
Hon. Nancy Gertner, From Omnipotence to Impotence: American Judges and Sentencing, 4
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 523, 530, 539 (2007) (describing “robust judicial opposition to the
Guidelines”); Hon. Nancy Gertner, Supporting Advisory Guidelines, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV.
261, 267 (2009) (commenting that district court judges “had overwhelmingly opposed the
Guidelines”); Michael W. McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 681 (2006)
246
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“threaten to transform the venerable ritual of sentencing into a puppet
theater . . . .”251 Indeed, federal judges in their judicial opinions have also
had harsh words for the perceived injustices of the Guidelines, calling them:
“unworkable,” “unfair,” “a prescription for injustice,” and “exceptionally
harsh.”252 Even senators who voted for the Guidelines recognize these issues.
Senator Orrin Hatch observed: “A lot of judges hate the sentencing
guidelines; they hate the mandatory minimums.
I can understand
why . . . .”253 Legal scholars have also noted that “[c]riticisms of the structure,
content, and operation of the pre-Booker Guidelines are legion . . . .”254
But, of course, not all within-Guidelines sentences can fairly be
attributed to anchoring. Scott, in attempting to minimize the anchoring effect
of the Guidelines as an explanation for the continued strong and persistent
tethering to the Guidelines post-Booker, has argued that “some judges
actually agree with the Guidelines’ recommendations or consciously choose
to impose within-range sentences for institutional reasons.”255 Certainly, that
is true. Some judges post-Booker likely impose Guidelines sentences more
(“But not long after they were enacted, the Guidelines began to attract serious criticism, which
became more vehement as years went by. Many critics, especially federal judges, argued that
the rigidity of the Guidelines prevented judges from sentencing defendants in accordance with
the justice of the particular case.” (footnote omitted)).
251
Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91
NW. U. L. REV. 1247, 1263 (1997) (“[T]he Guidelines threaten to transform the venerable
ritual of sentencing into a puppet theater in which defendants are not persons, but kinds of
persons, abstract entities to be defined by a chart, their concrete existence systematically
ignored and thus nullified.”).
252
See, e.g., United States v. Spencer, 700 F.3d 317, 326 (8th Cir. 2012) (Bright, J.,
dissenting) (“Since their adoption in 1987, many of the federal sentencing guidelines have
proven unworkable, unfair, and have filled our federal prisons with defendants serving
undeserved lengthy sentences . . . .”); United States v. Brewer, 899 F.2d 503, 513 (6th Cir.
1990) (Merritt, C.J., dissenting) (describing the Guidelines as “a prescription for injustice
because district judges can no longer prevent the imposition of inappropriately harsh
sentences”); United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312, 1335 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
dissenting) (“The positivist view [of the Sentencing Guidelines], applied unflinchingly to this
case, commands the affirmance of prison sentences that are exceptionally harsh by the
standards of the modern Western world, dictated by an accidental, unintended scheme of
punishment nevertheless implied by the words (taken one by one) of the relevant
enactments.”).
253
Blakely v. Washington and the Future of the Sentencing Guidelines: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 3–4 (2004) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Judiciary).
254
Berman, supra note 225, at 363. Berman also observed that “[t]wo scholars recently
summarized many of these sentiments, observing that the Guidelines ‘have been the subject
of sustained criticism from judges, lawyers, scholars, and members of Congress, and a wide
consensus has emerged that the Federal Guidelines have in many ways failed.’” Id. at 363
n.85 (quoting Robert Weisberg & Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Lessons, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1, 2
(2005)).
255
Scott, supra note 226, at 2.
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often than others to promote uniformity. Others weigh policy or potential
policy disagreements with the Guidelines in determining how much weight,
if any, to give them. Some Guidelines, like the former 100:1 crack/powder
cocaine Guideline, and to some extent the current 18:1 ratio, generate less
gravitational pull.256 And then there are the child pornography Guidelines,
recently derided by one scholar, “the new crack cocaine in the sentencing
world.”257 Melissa Hamilton concludes that the child pornography Guideline
“is nonsensical and incongruous with normal sentencing practices”; that it
“fails to represent the Commission’s institutional abilities and has not
incorporated the federal judiciary’s learned judgments on the reasonableness
of sentencing for these crimes”; and that the “child pornography guideline
recommends sentences that are extraordinarily disproportionate . . . .”258 And
drug trafficking Guidelines are no more rational than the child pornography
Guidelines. In United States v. Diaz, Judge John Gleeson recently laid bare
what not all judges realize: the drug trafficking Guidelines have been deeply
flawed from the beginning and “are not based on empirical data and national
experience . . . .”259 Given the widespread dissatisfaction among federal
district judges with the Guidelines, judicial acceptance cannot possibly
explain the extent of judges’ tethering to the Guidelines. Moreover, Scott’s
cursory minimization of the anchoring effects of the Guidelines undermines
the strength of his argument.260
256

See, e.g., Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) (holding that judges could
vary from the 100:1 crack/powder Guidelines, even in a mine-run case based on a categorical
policy disagreement); United States v. Williams, 788 F. Supp. 2d 847 (N.D. Iowa 2011)
(Bennett, J.) (continuing, after the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat.
2372, the categorical policy disagreement from the old 100:1 to the new 18:1 crack/powder
ratio even in mine-run cases).
257
Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy
Nullification, GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1), available at
http://goo.gl/7LIGls
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Id. at 62.
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United States v. Diaz, No. 11-CR-00821-2 (JG), 2013 WL 322243, at *1 (E.D.N.Y.
Jan. 28, 2013).
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Scott, supra note 226, at 45–46. Scott contends that the advisory Guidelines are
supposed to serve as an anchor, and thus cognitive anchoring “seems strained.” Id. at 45.
Scott ignores and summarily dismisses the incredible body of cognitive anchoring research
that Ryan barely mentions in passing, citing just one anchoring study. Id. at 45 n.202.
Moreover, Scott’s quote from Gall that the Guidelines should be the “starting point and the
initial benchmark,” is taken completely out of context. Id. at 19. A fair reading of this quote
is that the Gall Court described how the actual sentencing hearing is to be structured, not the
judges’ presentencing hearing approach to the PSR and a preliminary sentencing range. See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007). Scott’s argument that there are numerous
other numerical anchors also ignores the actual sentencing process that happens in the real
world where the Guidelines range in the PSR is virtually always the most powerful numerical
anchor and, of course, the first and often only one to which the judge is exposed.
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Indeed, the anchoring effect is so strong that even when people are told
to ignore it in subsequent judgments, the effect remains powerful.261 More
pernicious is that participants in anchoring studies deny that anchoring had
an effect on their judgments when in fact “substantial anchoring effects were
found.”262 Thus, even if judges become aware of how the Guidelines
cognitively anchor their sentencing practices, they are likely to deny its
existence in specific cases. Cognitive research has outlined the conditions
necessary to overcome the anchoring effect and for people to “avoid making
contaminated judgments . . . .”263 These conditions are (1) “[p]eople must be
aware that bias has occurred”; (2) “be motivated to correct the bias”;
(3) “know the direction and magnitude of the bias”; and (4) “have sufficient
control over their responses to be able to correct for the bias.”264 Because the
anchoring effect “occur[s] unintentionally and outside of awareness,”265
judges who become aware of it and are motivated to prevent it still have to
determine “the direction and magnitude of the effect” to adjust for it.266 The
purpose of the modest proposal below is to help achieve each of these
conditions to avoid “contaminated” sentencing decisions subconsciously
anchored by the advisory Guidelines.
VI. A MODEST PROPOSAL
The Court in Rita appropriately observed that “[t]he sentencing judge,
as a matter of process, will normally begin by considering the [PSR] and its
interpretation of the Guidelines.”267 Gall followed with a more commanding
and somewhat incorrect observation of Rita that “[a]s we explained in Rita,
a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range.”268 Importantly, how a judge
“normally” or “should” begin a sentencing hearing says nothing about the
order of the information presented in the PSR or how the judge should
prepare for the sentencing hearing. Based on my experience in reading over
3,500 PSRs in four districts, spanning two circuits, the Guidelines
calculations are always presented before most of the other § 3553(a) factors
(often only “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” § 3553(a)(1), is
presented before the calculated Guidelines range). However, nothing in
either Rita or Gall, Rule 32, or any decision I am aware of, requires either
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268

Wilson et al., supra note 43, at 400.
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Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007).
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49 (2007) (emphasis added).
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that the PSR present the Guidelines calculations first before disclosing and
discussing the other § 3553(a) factors, or that the sentencing judge review the
Guidelines calculations prior to reviewing the other § 3553(a) factors.269
I suggest that the sentencing judge should review and study the
information in a PSR’s non-Guidelines § 3553(a) first. While this approach
would require a reversal of the traditional format of the order of information
in the PSR, it is a matter of custom and practice and can easily be changed.
Any judge may request that the order of information in the PSR be reversed.
I strongly urge that this long-standing practice be reversed to lessen the
anchoring effect of the Guidelines calculation.
But there is more to my proposal. If this is all that is done, the anchoring
effect of the Guidelines would still be too robust and powerful. The key to
my proposal is that a sentencing judge, before reviewing the Guidelines
calculations, first review the non-Guidelines § 3553(a) factors and determine
a preliminary sentencing range without exposure to the Guidelines range
computed in the PSR. Thus, the judge would first examine all but the
advisory Guidelines range, as the Court described the § 3553(a) factors in
Rita. The judge would look at:
(1) offense and offender characteristics; (2) the need for a sentence to reflect the basic
aims of sentencing, namely, (a) “just punishment” (retribution), (b) deterrence, (c)
incapacitation, (d) rehabilitation; (3) the sentences legally available; (4) the Sentencing
Guidelines; (5) Sentencing Commission policy statements; (6) the need to avoid
unwarranted disparities; and (7) the need for restitution.270

Under this proposal, the judge would carefully examine all of the above
factors, except factors 4 and 5, and then determine a tentative sentencing
range untethered from the advisory Guidelines. Once the tentative
sentencing range is developed, the judge would then examine the PSR’s
calculated advisory Guidelines range and any relevant Guidelines policy
statements. The tentative sentence would then be adjusted based on the
weight the judge believes the Guidelines should be given among all the other
§ 3553(a) factors. This would all be done as preparation prior to the
sentencing hearing. At the sentencing hearing, the judge would then, of
course, resolve any contested Guidelines issues, properly compute the
Guidelines range if there were any objections in the PSR, hear any witness
testimony, receive any exhibits, listen to the prosecution and defense’s
sentencing arguments, and hear the defendant’s allocution, if any. The judge
would then pronounce the sentence. This is all fully consistent with Gall.

269

Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does list the calculation of the
Guidelines as the first matter under Section (d), but the Rule does not require that the
information be presented to the judge in the PSR prior to the other Section 3553(a) factors.
270
Rita, 551 U.S. at 347–48.
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Such a proposal differs substantially from the one proposed by Jelani
Jefferson Exum.271 Exum proposes that federal judges be completely
relieved from computing a Guidelines range.272 Exum suggests, “[i]f the
Supreme Court would take the steps to do away with the Guidelines
calculation requirement, then perhaps Congress could be prompted to revise
the Guidelines so that they are still relevant to sentencing decisions.”273 I
suppose the Tooth Fairy could also remove the Guidelines calculations from
each PSR and leave the judge one dollar in its place. The obvious problem
with Exum’s suggestion is that it is impracticable and unrealistic because it
requires both a substantial reversal of current law by the Supreme Court and
favorable action by Congress that runs counter to the congressional intent in
passing the SRA. While I am deeply skeptical of Exum’s proposed solution,
her article is excellent in identifying the anchoring problem with Guidelines
calculations. I wholeheartedly agree that “blind reliance on the properly
calculated Guideline ranges as trustworthy anchors should be rethought.”274
My proposal also differs, but less dramatically so, from Anne Traum’s
proposal that to reduce the anchoring effect of the Guidelines, courts “should
instead consider the Guidelines midstream in the § 3553(a) analysis,” which
acknowledges that Traum’s “approach is not currently allowed under the
Supreme Court’s decisions. . . .”275 Traum concludes that her approach is
barred by the language in Gall that “[a]s a matter of administration and to
secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting point
and the initial benchmark.”276 Traum’s analysis brings to mind the Albert
Einstein quote: “In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice, they
are not.”277 As previously discussed, the Court in Gall was referring to the
actual sentencing hearing, not how judges arrive at a tentative sentence in
preparation for the sentencing hearing.
My modest proposal would have little impact on the process of
sentencing, but a significant salutary effect on the sentence. I am confident
most judges already formulate a tentative sentence after reading and
pondering the PSR, but prior to the sentencing hearing. That tentative
sentence, however, is anchored by judge exposure to the Guidelines range
271
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before the other § 3553(a) factors are considered. Under my proposal, the
judge would simply arrive at two tentative sentences—one before analyzing
the Guidelines range and the other after considering it. Judges would then at
least know what they thought fair sentences would be independent of the
Guidelines ranges. This is critically important:
Because anchor values ordinarily precede specific, individualized information, the
anchoring bias suggests that the first items of information are likely to receive more
consideration than information that appears later. Although the order in which
information is received should be irrelevant to decisions that rely on that information,
the mind does not work this way. First impressions are powerful influences on
judgment and seem to provide the prism through which subsequent information is
filtered. Even when first impressions are erroneous, they continue to affect judgment
long after they have been discredited.278

My proposal would reduce the effect of Guidelines-range anchoring and
result in fairer sentencing. Additionally, to reduce and counteract the
anchoring effect of the Guidelines in the PSR, other significant and useful
sentencing numerical information should be included in the PSR before the
Guidelines calculations and range appear. This information could possibly
include:
1) The average sentencing for the offense imposed in the district, in
all the districts within the circuit, and nationally, taking into
account the defendant’s criminal history;
2) The average frequency and extent of departures and variance for
the offense in the district, in all the districts within the circuit,
and nationally, taking into account the defendant’s criminal
history;
3) The average pre-Guidelines sentence for the offense; and/or
4) Recidivism data for the offense and criminal history obtained
from the USSC.
I suggest that this additional data should be used in the same manner as
the core of my proposal—disclosed in the PSR only after the other nonnumeric information is considered and the judge has formulated a
preliminary sentencing range untethered from anchoring effect of the
Guidelines or this new numerical information.
For this proposal to be accepted, judges would have to overcome their
blind spot bias and overcome “the operation of bias in human judgment—
except when that bias is their own.”279 In terms of recognizing cognitive
biases, it is important for judges to constantly doubt and reevaluate their own
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objectivity.280 It is particularly important given that judges tend to
overestimate their abilities to avoid biases in their own decisionmaking. By
way of example, one study found that 97% of judges (thirty-five out of thirtysix) scored themselves in the top half of that group in “avoid[ing] racial
prejudice in decisionmaking.”281 This is not mathematically possible. So
judges must be willing to recognize the anchoring effect, acknowledge that it
does not only occur with other judges, and be motivated to correct the bias.
Because the recent scientific evidence is so strong that our “blind spot”
creates a pervasive tendency to see bias in others but not in ourselves,282 I am
optimistic that once judges understand this, they will seek to overcome both
the anchoring effect and their blind spot biases.
CONCLUSION
Well-established principles of cognitive bias, known as the “anchoring
effect,” undermine judgments. That is, exposure to a numerical “anchor”
undermines the soundness of subsequent judgments by anchoring those
judgments to that numerical anchor. The history and breadth of cognitive
psychological studies demonstrates that the powerful nature of anchoring on
subsequent judgments occurs in all contexts of judgment. Amazingly, the
anchoring effect skews judgments even when the anchor is incomplete,
inaccurate, irrelevant, implausible, and even random. Anchoring studies
involving judges establish that judges are as susceptible as anyone to the
anchoring effect. These studies also show that judges are not insulated from
the effect by their specialization and expertise. Additionally, judges are
equally affected by another cognitive bias—the blind spot bias—which
allows them to see bias in others but not in themselves. This creates a double
bind for sentencing judges who subconsciously increase sentences as a result
of anchoring effects. Even when judges are made aware of the effect of
anchoring, they are unable to recognize it in their sentences. The dramatic
federal sentencing revolution of the last quarter century, which led to the
current substantially increased sentencing discretion of federal judges
unparalleled since the Sentencing Reform Act went into effect in 1987, has
not had much effect on the length of federal sentences.
Comprehensive data from the USSC establishes that the new discretion
has, for the most part, had a surprisingly limited impact on federal sentencing.
This is due primarily to the robust anchoring impact of first computing the
advisory Guidelines sentencing range before considering the other non280
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numerical § 3553(a) sentencing factors. This impact can be eliminated, or at
least substantially reduced with a modest, but important change that, unlike
other proposals, requires no shift or backtracking by the Supreme Court or
new legislation from Congress. This modest proposal suggests that federal
district court judges first review all the important non-Guidelines sentencing
factors contained in § 3553(a) and formulate a tentative sentence before
reviewing the advisory Guidelines range and getting subjected to its potential
powerful anchoring effect. Once a judge formulates a tentative sentencing
range uninfluenced by the anchoring effect of the advisory Guidelines range,
the judge should then consider what weight to give the advisory Guidelines
range in determining the ultimate sentence. In the end, increasing federal
district court judges’ knowledge of the powerful potential anchoring effect in
sentencing, coupled with a greater understanding of the blind spot bias,
should ensure fairer sentencing. This is true independent of my proposal.

